Writing Is Therapy

ANOTHER TRIAL FOR MALAYSIA
By Farish A. Noor

The trials and tribulations of Malaysia’s former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim continue, and history seems to be repeating itself time and again in the country. Ten years after the infamous trial where he was accused of sexual misconduct and abuse of power, Anwar Ibrahim is once again being investigated for charges of sexual misconduct with a man who was a member of his party, the People’s Justice Party (PKR) of Malaysia.

On 16th July Anwar was arrested just after he had given his testimony before the country’s Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), and on his way to give yet another testimony at the Police Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. A deadline had been set at 2.00 pm for him to show up at the police office, and though he was already on his way there he was apprehended near his home before the deadline had expired.

Anwar has since been arrested under the laws of section 377a of the Malaysian constitution that stipulates that ‘abnormal sex’ is a crime. Yet Malaysians have grown somewhat weary of the use of this law as the last time it was put to work was in 1998, when Anwar was also accused on ‘abnormal sex’. The trial that followed his arrest in 1998 was a shambolic affair that brought low the reputation of the Malaysian judiciary and security services; and the icing on the cake was the assault on Anwar that led to him being produced in court with bruises on his face and the infamous black eye that has been captured for posterity by the world’s media. Malaysia’s legal institutions suffered the biggest blow to their credibility as the court case that followed was scrutinised in detail by Malaysia-watchers the world over.

Today, things have changed and moved on: In 1998 Malaysia’s political crisis was sparked by Anwar’s arrest and the mobilisation of the masses by his political supporters who used tools like the internet and alternative media. Malaysia then had less than a million internet users, and Anwar’s nemesis Dr. Mahathir was at the peak of his popularity.

Malaysia today has moved on with nearly 12 million registered internet users and the creation of the most well-connected, well-informed and politically savvy electorate in its history. Furthermore the present government does not have half of the support that Dr. Mahathir enjoyed in 1998, with the ruling coalition being badly weakened after the election results of 2008. Anwar, on the other hand, is at the peak of his career and popularity; and many feel that this arrest was yet another attempt to prevent him from leading a popular movement to change the government.

On the night before his arrest, Anwar was seen on TV in a live debate about oil prices with a senior politician, Shabary Cheek. For Malaysians all over the country, this was perhaps the first time they had seen Anwar live on TV and allowed to speak his mind freely since his fall from grace in 1998. And the results of the debate were expected: Local polls suggested that the Malaysians saw Anwar as the winner of the debate and that his arguments were convincing.

Anwar’s arrest could therefore not have come at a worst time for the government of Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. The question on everyone’s lips is: How will this latest scenario play itself out in Malaysian politics, and what will be the results in the near future?

For a start it is unlikely that Anwar will be released anytime soon as there are fears that he will once again mobilise his supporters and call for massive demonstrations all over the country. But in jail Anwar is as effective an icon for the opposition and a magnet for those disaffected and disillusioned with the government of Prime Minister Badawi.

Prime Minister Badawi has in turn given assurances that the investigation into Anwar’s case will be done fairly and Anwar will be safe. Such assurances are, however, going to be held to account by a Malaysian public that is no longer prepared to accept the irregularities of the earlier trial of Anwar in 1998. This time round, every single step of the investigation will be watched by discerning Malaysians and the wider international community, and the expansion of Malaysia’s civil society and the internet means that every minute detail of the investigation will be made public.

Perhaps the only thing that can save Anwar, Badawi and Malaysia in the long run is an investigation and trial that is absolutely objective, transparent and accountable. For even the slightest hint of bias or irregularity will add credence to Anwar’s claim that the accusations against him are part of a political plot to prevent him from returning to politics; a fact that was stated in his closing remarks during his televised debate where he stated that he intended to contest at a by-election soon.

For now, the ball seems to be in Anwar’s court and it is he who stands to gain the most from his arrest. Whether in or out of jail, Anwar has resumed his status as martyr and public hero. While this may work in the favour of Anwar and other politicians in the country, other serious issues like economic and institutional reform have been sidelined once again. But this time it is not just Anwar and his reputation that is on trial, but also that of Malaysia and Malaysia’s legal and judicial systems as well. [Source]

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The Perils of Assimilationist Politics
By Farish A. Noor

A quick look at the troubles in the predominantly Muslim-Malay provinces of Southern Thailand – which has been a troubled spot for the past four years at least – would point to a fundamental flaw in the line of thinking of the powers-that-be in Bangkok. Having disregarded the historical factors that make the four provinces of Patani, Jala, Satun and Narathiwat unique compared to the rest of the country, successive governments in Thailand have tried to make the Malay-Muslims of the south think of themselves as Thais, who are an ethnically different people with a language, culture, religion and history of their own.

Since the late 19th century following the conquest of Patani, Jala, Satun and Narathiwat by the Thais, and compounded by the Anglo-Siamese treaty of 1909, the four provinces have experienced what can only be described as a policy of cultural assimilation. During the 1930s and 40s Thai leaders like Phibun Songkram have tried to force Thai culture and cultural norms on the Malays by any means possible: From forcing them to speak Thai to adapting Thai dress and manners as their own.

Needless to say, this has alienated the Malay-Muslims even further, and has only helped to fuel the resentment they feel against the Thai political elite. Over the past four years this resentment has boiled over to the point of violence, leading to the needless and senseless slaughter of innocent Malays and Thais all over the south.

But looking further to the other countries of Southeast Asia we see a similar pattern at work too. The government of Indonesia tried, in the 1950s and 1960s, to force the Chinese minority of the country to adapt and adopt Indonesian cultural norms as well. The Chinese language was cast as a foreign language, Chinese culture was deemed alien and the Chinese were forced to assimilate by taking on Indonesian names and thereby losing their identity. This was done for the sake of national unity and integration, but it was well known that the driving factors behind this were really the conservative and racist elements of the ethno-nationalist right who wished to eliminate all traces of difference in the country. Sukarno was not able or not willing to defend the cultural identity of the Chinese minority, and the net result was the denial of the fact that the Chinese (like the Arabs, Indians and other migrant communities) had settled in the Indonesian archipelago for at least five hundred years.

In Malaysia the elites of the country have likewise been hard at work promoting the ideology of Malay dominance following the racial clashes of 1969. Time and again successive Malaysian politicians have harped on and on about the racial violence in May 1969 and used that as the leitmotif for a cultural assimilationist policy that has only alienated the other communities and which has denied them the right to make their cultural mark on the country.

But while successive generations of right-wing Malay-Muslim politicians in Malaysia have talked at length about the race riots of May 1969, they conveniently overlook that Malaysia has always been a nation of migrants and itinerant communities, and that the so-called ‘foreign’ Indians and Chinese have likewise settled in the land for at least five hundred years. So how long does a migrant have to stay in any country before she or he is accepted as local?

The simmering ethno-cultural and ethno-religious tensions that threaten to rip apart the countries of Southeast Asia thus all have the same factor in common: The desire on the part of the dominant group to impose their cultural-ethnic-religious stamp on all other minorities. Hence the dominance of Burmese culture in Burma, where the Burmese are in fact one of many communities; and the dominance of the Thais in Thailand where there are other communities too. Likewise in Malaysia and Indonesia the nation-building process has been overtaken by the exclusive agendas of the dominant communities despite the fact that these are really multiracial and multi-religious polities that are plural and diverse.

How do we get past this impasse of our own making then? Perhaps the biggest failure of the postcolonial states of Southeast Asia is the fact that most of them took off on an integrationist, assimilationist footing and were foregrounding a national agenda that was sectarian and divisive from the outset. In Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Burma, the concept of universal citizenship remains a distant abstract notion when in fact it ought to have been the foundational pillar to the nation-building process itself.

But nations are all works in progress and thankfully it is never too late to change tack and take on a new trajectory. Part of the solution to the woes of Southern Thailand would be to recognize that the four provinces of the south have a history of their own that demands and requires respect and recognition. The plight of the Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand is no different from the appeal of non-Malay and non-Muslim minorities in Malaysia and Indonesia: ‘Listen to us, respect us, recognize our culture, language and identity. And then we will be citizens like any other.’

But can the political elite of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia listen to the appeals of the marginal and the minorities? Or will the same cycle of denial, assimilation, forced integration and ultimately violence and rebellion continue to repeat itself, and become the defining feature of the failed nation-building process in all these countries? [Source]

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